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The significance of money. Beyond Ingham's sociology of money 
(pre-proofed version, European Journal of Sociology) 
Stefano Sgambati 
 
Understanding money requires that we first grasp what makes money so significant - so 
valuable - to us. The article thus examines the sociology outlined by Geoffrey Ingham and 
criticises its ontology of money as a measure of value underpinned by state authority. By 
contrast, it argues that money ought to be primarily intended as value in itself. Accordingly, 
money's most specific attribute is none of its canonical functions but rather purchasing 
power: the power not to pay, or else the power to buy time. The latter is not the mere product 
of state (fiscal) agency, but is entangled from the start with the production of liquidity and the 
construction of speculative markets for debt. Thus the paper emphasises the importance of 
concrete bank discounting vis-à-vis abstract accounting in concrete processes of 
monetisation, and shows how modern money, far from cancelling debts, is historically 
constructed within liquid financial relations so as to 'buy time' and systematically 
procrastinate the final 'rendering of accounts' for debtors. As a result, money cannot exist 
without the simultaneous existence of a debt that it will never discharge. 
 
Introduction: the problematic nature of money 
Of the many reflections on the money phenomenon produced in the last two decades, 
Geoffrey Ingham's work (1996; 2000; 2004; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2013) undoubtedly 
stands as one of the most valuable contributions. In particular, in The nature of 
money (2004), Ingham has produced a remarkable attempt to reconcile within a 
comprehensive sociology the many, and often contradictory, strands in the 
"underworld" of post-Keynesian monetary analysis (Ingham 2004, p. 11). Ingham's 
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great merit is to have shown how orthodox monetary analysis is grounded in an a-
historical and a-social understanding that is only concerned with establishing "the 
logical preconditions for money's existence" (Ingham 1996, p. 515), but which "does 
not possess an adequate ontological theory of money" (Ingham 1996, p. 509) capable 
of grasping the social-historical specificity of money, namely "how it functions and 
how it is maintained as a social institution" (Ingham 2004, p. 10). At the core of the 
mainstream doctrine is a functionalistic understanding of money - i.e. money is what 
money does - that is nearly exclusively focused on the medium of exchange function, 
and which assumes all other monetary functions as either given by, or derived from, 
the former (Ingham 2000, p. 17). In particular, the basic ontological error of orthodox 
economics is "to identify forms of money and their circulation with the quality of 
'moneyness'" (Ingham 2004, p. 9): "in this conception 'moneyness' is somewhat 
tautologically 'exchangeability' - that is, the most 'liquid' commodity" (Ingham 2004, 
p. 6). By contrast, Ingham maintains that "money consists in 'claims' and 'credits'" 
(Ingham 2004, p. 6) that can only exist in relation to an abstract measure, or "money 
of account" as Keynes originally termed it (Keynes 1930).  
Ingham's critique of mainstream economics, however, is not primarily focused on 
its ontological limits per se but on its methodological fallacies. In fact, according to 
Ingham orthodox "real analysis" only comprises an analysis of "object-object 
relations (exchange ratios between commodities, or the 'production function'), and 
individual agent-object relations (individual acts of utility calculation, or the 'utility 
function')", but it does not encompass an analysis of "agent-agent, or social, 
relations" (Ingham 2004, pp. 16-17). Such a (lack of) methodological focus makes 
ontological specification superfluous because it renders by default the nature of 
money positive, that is, given or determined by the impenetrable and a-historical 
rationality of the market. Altogether this positivist understanding implicitly supports 
the ideology that money, as a pure symbol-number, is neutral and thus does not 
affect the socio-economic process (Ingham 2004, pp. 16-17). The mainstream take on 
money can be accordingly epitomised as follows: money is what money does, and 
what it does doesn't really matter. Read: laissez faire! 
Ingham's methodological project, on the contrary, moves from the basic 
assumption that money "can only be sensibly seen as being constituted by social 
relations" (Ingham 1996, p. 510), hence conceptualised as a social power that does 
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matter. Ingham's sociology thus revolves around four major interrelated themes, or 
"fundamentals of a theory of money" (Ingham 2004, pp. 69-85), that are constructed 
in radical opposition to the main tenets of mainstream economics: first, money is not 
essentially a medium of exchange but an abstract measure of value, or money of 
account; second, money does not consist substantially in a commodity, but in an 
abstract claim (a credit, a promise, an institutional power); third, money is not a by-
product of a barter-like market exchange but, following the German Historical 
School, it is an institution underpinned by state authority; finally, money is not 
neutral in the economic process but is on the contrary an autonomous economic 
force.  
Critically, I am going to argue in this article that Ingham fails to provide a 
theoretically consistent alternative to mainstream economics and, eventually, to grasp 
the actual significance - or "specificity" (Ingham 2007) - of money. On the contrary, 
his sociology reproduces an understanding that is in many respects as 
methodologically deficient and contorted as its orthodox counterparts, and equally 
blameable for a residual "economic determinism" (Konings 2010). Indeed, in spite of 
its professed methodological relationalism, Ingham similarly relies on a mixture of 
logical and "meta-theoretical" argumentations to justify the nature, origins and 
development of money from without (not from within) social relations. In particular, 
he systematically resorts to the ad hoc agency of the state (which is in fact steered by 
a subtle market logic) in order to justify the fact that money bears value.  
My critique will first and foremost be a methodological and conceptual critique. 
My main point is simple: in order to understand money we must approach it neither 
as a measure (or medium) of value, nor as a claim to value, but as a value in itself. As 
such, money cannot be unilaterally established by an authority, but ought to be 
constantly negotiated within social relations. I will thus proceed as follows: in the 
first section I question the validity of Ingham's nominalist ontology and argue that 
money is 'by nature' neither a measure nor a claim but, if anything, a unity in context 
of the two. Such a conceptualisation, however, still tells us very little about how 
money comes about in the world and why. Thus, in the second section I argue that a 
proper ontological reflection on the money phenomenon should subordinate the 
question of the 'dual' nature of money, as a measure/unit and a claim, to the question 
of its significance as a 'whole', or 'unity'. To that purpose, money should be granted in 
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principle the phenomenological status of value: a gestalt, metaphor and form of 
social relations. Accordingly, the most specific attribute of money 'as we know it' is 
none of its canonical functions (with the partial exception of the store of value 
function): instead, it is purchasing power. Critically, the latter cannot be understood 
without reference to historical processes of monetisation and market-making in the 
modern political economy. In the third section I therefore proceed to highlight the 
flaws in Ingham's account of the historical origins and development of money. Other 
than discussing the emergence of monetary functions, this account does not 
encompass a theory for understanding actual processes of monetisation and the 
construction of speculative markets for debts. Instead, it constantly relies on the 
extra-economic agency of the state to justify institutional transformations and 
developments in monetary practice. Undoubtedly, Ingham does emphasise the 
centrality of the state in the creation of money also to invalidate the market-driven 
thesis of its origins. However, especially when it comes to explaining how money 
gets its value, Ingham ultimately frames the state authority (and, subsequently, the 
monetary authorities) as the most economic of all agents. In particular, as I show in 
the fourth section, by postulating the primacy of the fiscal agency of the state in the 
making of money, Ingham is caught in a fundamental paradox: the state can only 
gives 'substance' (qua purchasing power) to money by promoting a market for it, de 
facto behaving as an economic agent that is committed to commercialising its own 
promise of payment in line with market imperatives. In the final section I further 
investigate the relationship between states and markets in the creation of money, and 
uncover in Ingham's discourse a subterranean theme of money as liquidity. This 
theme is somehow camouflaged as a question of credibility in 'stable money', and 
framed in a way that the value of money no longer seems to be the concrete product 
of a 'battle of man with man', but appears as the abstract outcome of a battle of ideas, 
as performed by 'epistemic communities'. Finally, in the conclusions I summarise my 
argument on the significance of money and offer some guidelines for future studies 
in money and finance. 
 
The money of account: a measure with no value  
Ingham's primary concern is to provide an adequate ontology of money (Ingham 
1996), and thus answer to the most basic question - what is money? - without 
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incurring the classic functionalist error. Hence from his perspective money cannot 
simply be what money does, and this in turn seems to imply an impossibility to 
provide a straightforward and unitary definition of the phenomenon. Money is 
indeed conceptualised as a dual entity: an infrastructural power that provides the 
basis "for the progressive rationalization of social life" and "expands human society's 
capacity to get things done" as well as a despotic power that "can be appropriated by 
particular interests" (Ingham 2004, p. 4).  
This phenomenal duplicity finds its semantic poles respectively in the concepts of 
measure and claim. The first is the proxy of a universal instrumentality (i.e. a 
structural property) whose ratio cannot be appropriated by the subject but only be 
governed by society as a social system. The second is the proxy of a particular 
finality (i.e. an agential feature) that can and must be pursued and appropriated by 
the subject. Significantly, money encompasses these two seemingly contradictory 
features: it is "uniquely specified as a measure of abstract value (money of account) 
[...] and a means of storing and transporting this abstract value (for means of final 
payment or settlement of debt)" (Ingham 2004, p. 70).  
To be sure, most contemporary scholars explicitly refer to money as a dual and 
deceptive phenomenon that is capable of articulating in a sense the contradictions 
between subjective agencies and objective structures (see Hodgson 2001, p. 296). 
Dodd (2005a, p. 563; 2005b, pp. 406-7), for instance, sustains that all monies share 
two basic qualities: they are at once general and abstract units of account, or 
monetary denominations, and particular and concrete (though not necessarily 
tangible) media of exchange. In a similar vein, Zelizer (2000; 2011) argues that all 
monies serve both general and local circuits and entail at once uniformity and 
diversity. In general, it is safe to assume that after Aristotle virtually every scholar 
would agree that money is an actual paradox, or a peculiar non-sense, as the Greek 
philosopher put it1. According to Konings (2011a), such a dualistic understanding of 
money is due to the fact that our theorisations merely register, though always in 
peculiar ways, "the fact that in our everyday practices we are capable of grasping 
money as both universal and particular at the very same time".  
Critically, despite recognising a fundamental duplicity in the money phenomenon, 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, Politics, 1257b: 8-17. See also Amato 2010b. 
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Ingham does not really try to make sense of the unity that the general measure and 
the particular claim contextually articulate in the name of money. Instead, he opts to 
uphold the former over the latter as the primary concept for a theory of money. 
Hence he assigns ontological specificity to the measure of value alone. As he puts it, 
"[m]oneyness is assigned by the money of account, not by the form of money", for 
"the money of account is logically anterior to any form of money that bears the 
abstract value" (Ingham 2004, p. 70). Accordingly, "the very idea of money, which is 
to say, of abstract accounting for value, is logically anterior and historically prior to 
market exchange" (Ingham 2004, p. 25).  
Ingham's choice to uphold the measure over the claim is quite controversial. This 
conceptual position, referred to as monetary nominalism, is traced back to the earlier 
ideas of Keynes who, in the first pages of his Treatise On Money (1930), 
distinguished between a nominal money-of-account and a real money (which he 
termed "money-proper"). As he famously argued, "the money-of-account is the 
description or title and the money is the thing which answers to the description" 
(Keynes 1930, pp. 3-4), so that money "in the full sense of the term can only exist in 
relation to Money of Account" (Keynes 1930, p. 3). This said, it is worth pointing out 
that despite making a number of statements on the importance of the money of 
account (especially in the very first pages of his Treatise), Keynes never explicitly 
argued for the ontological specificity, or primacy, of the "description" (indeed, how 
can a description be logically anterior and historically prior to the value-thing that 
answers to it?). On the contrary, he was clear enough to define money properly 
speaking as the thing that answers to the description, namely as that the "delivery of 
which will discharge the contract or the debt" (Keynes 1930, p. 5). Accordingly, the 
great bulk of the Treatise's Book I (on the nature of money) was devoted to analysing 
and classifying the concrete forms that money could take as a means of payment and 
exchange, yet no effort was put into questioning its alleged essence as the 
description-idea of "abstract accounting for value" (Ingham 2004, p. 25).  
Notably, the same subtle ontological realism (but perhaps I should say formalism), 
placing the means of payment rather than the money of account at the core of 
monetary analysis, can also be inferred from Knapp's original thesis, which Keynes 
openly subscribed in his Treatise, and according to which "all money, whether of 
metal or of paper, is only a special case of the means of payment in general" (Knapp 
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1924, p. 2). More specifically, for Knapp money is a creature of the state insofar as 
the latter is able to impose a tax debt on its subjects and then choose what will 
redeem them at "State pay offices" (Knapp 1924, p. 95).  
Drawing on Knapp, Keynes has thus argued that the age of chartalist money, that 
is, the age of money properly speaking, is reached when the state is in the condition 
to claim the right not only to enforce the description, but also to establish that which 
answers to it (Keynes 1930, p. 5). This, writes Keynes, goes as far back as four 
thousand years ago - in practice, to the dawn of civilizations. Therefore it would 
make little sense to debate about what comes first between the money of account and 
the means of payment, the measure and the claim, because we can only understand 
the latter in relation to the former, and vice versa - precisely as a unity in context. 
That is, measure and claim are necessarily instituted by the same token.  
Ingham, by contrast, separates the institutional genesis of the measure from that of 
the claim: the former is prior to the market; the latter, we shall see, is contingent 
upon it. And so, paradoxically, in his attempt to confute the ontological primacy of 
the medium of exchange, he similarly gets stuck on a pseudo-ontological ground 
whereby he can merely re-establish a "logical foundation of money" (Ingham 2004, 
p. 89, emphasis added). His theorem is straightforward: if we don't name the money-
thing first, we cannot own it and hence alienate it. In other words, unless we speak 
the same monetary language and hence agree upon a nominal unit of account, we 
will not be able to express prices, arrange contracts with each other and eventually 
settle debts - whence the rationale for ontological nominalism. This leaves out a most 
fundamental question: what is it that we are actually naming and claiming when we 
speak money in our daily transactions?2 Furthermore, why do we need a monetary 
language to begin with? 
 
The (neglected) phenomenon of purchasing power 
Scholars, including heterodox ones, often forget that by means of money we do not 
just name the material world of the political economy (its means and forces of 
                                                 
2 A similar question - and namely "money talks, but what is it saying?" - is posed by Wennerlind 
(2001) in his article on the semiotics of money, where he analyses money as a "discourse of power" 
(Wennerlind 2001, p. 558).  
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production) so that we can finally exchange its products, but we make claims on it 
about what it is worth (producing and exchanging) and what it is not. By doing so we 
do not simply co-measure values, but we bring them into being. Stated differently, 
money does not simply denote a metrological system for the accounting of debts and 
the scaling of prices but, more importantly, it also connotes a process of 
signification/valorisation in which values are constantly and contextually becoming 
and mutating in the name of money - that is, in virtue of the myth of an endless 
accumulation of money that is entirely uprooted from, and which yet embraces and 
gives sense to, the material world of production.  
Pace ontological nominalism, in this process of signification the nominal measure 
can only come into existence along with real value, and in particular along with the 
value of debts, as Keynes (1930, p. 4) has pointed out. Logically, monetary 
commensuration is always finalised to claiming worth in payment and exchange3. In 
this respect, the question of what comes first between the measure and the claim (or 
the medium) is a classic 'chicken or egg dilemma' that tells us very little about the 
institutional genesis of money and its political and economic significance. A proper 
ontology should therefore move beyond the basic question of 'what money is', which 
is so often translated into an abstract semantics of monetary functions/uses (see for 
instance Polanyi 1980), and aim to respond to a more fundamental question: "how 
money is" (Bjerg 2014), and why. In other words, ontology should overcome logical 
analysis and embrace phenomenological understanding, so as to move in the 
direction of a semiotics of money: a study of why and how money is historically 
constituted as an icon (Konings 2011a) that seems to act autonomously and which is 
experienced to bear value in itself.  
To this purpose, and in order to avoid the positivist fallacy of orthodox monetary 
analysis (i.e. the reduction of the institution of money to an a-historical rationality, 
law, or logic of exchange), I contend that the question of the Janus-faced nature of 
money ought to be recast in terms of its emblematic significance as a 'whole'. Money 
must be accordingly conceptualised as a value (a metaphor, a gestalt) that institutes a 
certain way of experiencing and finalising the quid pro quo of exchange (see Shell 
                                                 
3 Analogously, Saiag (2014, p. 574) has recently argued that "if money is a system of evaluation and 
settlement of debts, then monetary practices consist of both accounting and settlement. The question, 
therefore, is no longer whether payment, exchange and accounting can be observed separately from 
each other, but what kind of debts are evaluated and settled in each monetary practice". 
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1982; Amato 2010a; 2010b; Konings 2011a). For if money, as a measure and a 
claim, does logically imply exchange, the reverse is not true. Indeed, as 
anthropologists have long concluded, exchange can and does exist without money. 
Hence ontology should be instrumental to setting out the terms for the following 
phenomenological enquiry: what is the need or, better, the absence (Amato 2010b; 
Legendre 2005, p. 111), that money, 'as an institution', is meant to historically 
materialise in its twofold and deceptive articulation of measure and claim, universal 
and particular, structure and agency, means and end? More specifically, in what sense 
does money, as a value and a metaphor, connote the social text when it is 'uttered'? 
And, reciprocally, in what consists the dimension of silence that this new 'word' (or 
perhaps I should say 'figure of speech') opens with regards to social relations of 
exchange (Amato 2010a, p. 74)?  
To answer this question or, better, to bring the question of 'money as value' into 
being, we must start from the common sense of what makes money so worth being 
pursued in the daily praxis: purchasing power. At first sight, purchasing power 
simply satisfies the need to pay and exchange, in line with the orthodox view. 
However, on a closer examination, purchasing power also materialises an absence 
(Amato 2010b), namely the power not to pay and exchange. The latter directly 
relates to the store of value function, "money's least specific attribute" according to 
Ingham (1996, p. 525). The reason is simple: to own the power to pay and exchange 
implies the possibility to store this power and hence, following Commons (1924), to 
withhold it from others. In this regard, it has been argued that money should be 
termed more properly "purchasing potential", as it "can remain indefinitely in the 
state of potentiality" (Amato and Fantacci 2012, p. 37; see also Werner 2005, p. 187).  
Keynes captured the significance of purchasing power as the institution of the 
possibility not to pay in his famous "liquidity preference hypothesis" (Keynes 1936), 
where he elucidated the relationship between the demand of money and the rate of 
interest (I will discuss the theme of liquidity in the final section). Building on his 
insights, Minsky has subsequently shown how the capitalist monetary economy is 
inherently unstable because of a fragile financial structure that entails the systematic 
formation of spirals of debt deferrals. As these 'credit cycles' unfold, economic agents 
are likely to get caught in speculative practices of debt financing, to the point that 
they will seek money to merely pay interest on outstanding liabilities (see Minsky 
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1977; 1986; Ingham 2008, pp. 40-3; Nesvetailova 2007; 2010).  
When the economy reaches this 'Ponzi stage', money is sought-after mostly in 
order to procrastinate the final fulfilment of debt commitments. As it were, towards 
the end of its 'life-cycle' money reveals itself as the power to buy time in financial 
markets, to the point of putting overall exchanges to a stall when the financial bubble 
finally busts. As a result:  
[money] makes it possible for saving to be entirely unconnected with concrete goods and 
to take place rather through the constant and indefinite accumulation of abstract 
purchasing power, in the precise sense of power independent of the fact of being 
concretely exerted – so independent as to jeopardize the very possibility of it being 
exerted. (Amato and Fantacci 2012, p. 42)  
The notion of purchasing power thus brings into focus the normative and institutional 
character of money as a concrete object of finance, hence as something that is more 
than a measure of, and a claim to, value. Indeed, as purchasing power, money 
appears as "a socially constructed abstract value which is measured by its own scale 
of value" (Ingham 2007, p. 268); "the value of things in pure abstraction" (Simmel, 
cited in Ingham 2004, p. 71); "one of those normative ideas that obey the norm that 
they themselves represent" (Simmel, cited in Ingham 2004, p. 74). In short, as 
purchasing power, money appears as the 'fundamental value' of the (political) 
economy. 
It must be said in this respect that, unlike the idea of 'abstract accounting for 
value', purchasing power cannot be found everywhere in history (with the wisdom of 
hindsight), but is an institution specific to the modern world. Indeed, as Ingham 
(2000, p. 21, emphasis in the original) suggests, money "makes possible the 
reproduction and continuity of economic life" only when its institution finally 
assumes this seemingly transcendental, self-referential and autonomous form of 
value, and this has only taken place in conjunction with the rise of credit-money and 
the advent of capitalism. In this respect, Ingham also laments that one of the major 
deficiencies of orthodox monetary analysis is that it fails to "specify why money, as 
opposed to any other functionally alternative asset, performs as an intergenerational 
store of value", or else "as a temporal transporter of abstract value" (Ingham 2000, p. 
21). Put simply, orthodox theory is unable to explain why and how money gets 
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historically constructed so as to bear purchasing power. However, as I will argue in 
the next section, Ingham also is unable to explain how money historically gets its 
value as from within social relations. Instead, his account of the historical origins and 
development of money (Ingham 2004, pp. 89-133) ought to systematically rely on 
the ad hoc agency of the state in order to justify the institutional transformations of 
money and the monetisation of debt relations.  
 
A history of money without a theory of monetisation 
Ingham's account of the history of money can be described, using his own words, as 
a "developmental sequence of the social structure of monetary practice" (Ingham 
2000, p. 27). The sequence starts with the institution, lost in the mists of time, of the 
original idea of money "as a measure of value for representing and accounting for the 
(utilitarian and symbolic) worth of social positions and roles" (Ingham 2000, p. 27). 
It is assumed in this respect that primordial monies of account were devised by 
(proto-state) sacred authorities "to calculate differential debts to society" (Ingham 
2004, p. 91) and to establish wergeld as a "worth payment" (Ingham 2004, p. 92). 
Following the (conjectural) emergence of primordial monies of account in pre-
historic (and pre-economic) settings, we witness the actual emergence of "standards 
of value based upon quantitative relations between commodities expressed in a 
money of account" (Ingham 2000, p. 27; 2004, p. 91). This development took place 
for the first time in third-millennium BC Mesopotamia, when the temple and palatial 
authorities of the ancient Near East began to develop metrological systems for 
administering the prices of commodities (see Hudson 2004). The establishment of 
price systems (in what are by now economic settings) is then followed by the 
institution of "standardized means of payment/stores of value" in the second 
millennium BC (Ingham 2000, p. 27) and, finally, by the constitution of a totalising 
money system rooted in a general means of payment and exchange: coinage. This 
stage historically started around 600 BC in ancient Greece, and culminated with the 
consolidation of the Roman "coinage-military complex" (Ingham 2000, p. 27; 2004, 
pp. 89-106).  
Unfortunately, Ingham does not provide any clear mechanism of causation for his 
developmental sequence. In particular, he does not explain the primordial transition 
from moral to economic debts, namely why and how "the calculation of social 
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obligations was transformed into a means of measuring the equivalences between 
commodities" (Ingham 2004, p. 91). Rather, each development appears as unfolding 
from the agency of a pre-existing extra-economic authority. This is fundamentally in 
line with Ingham's understanding that "money - as a social institution - is produced 
by non-market agencies and does not obey the economic 'laws' of the production and 
exchange of commodities" (Ingham 2000, p. 22). The rationale for this argument is, 
once again, logical: since "the process of exchange cannot produce the measure" 
(Ingham 2006, p. 261; 2004, p. 23), then the latter "must be introduced by an 
'authority'" (Ingham 2004, p. 49). Accordingly, money "always has an authoritative 
foundation" (Ingham 2006, p. 271). 
Interestingly, following the disintegration of the Roman empire (and its coinage 
system), the 'developmental sequence' got started again from scratch with the re-
institution of myriad standards of account corresponding to equally numerous 
sovereign spaces in Europe. These monetary standards were thus incorporated under 
the rule of Charlemagne into a transnational metrological system, also known as the 
regime of moneta immaginera. Crucially, with the consolidation of moneta 
immaginera, the money of account was dissociated, or de-linked, from the means of 
payment4 once again (Ingham 2000, p. 28; 2004, pp. 107-112). As Ingham explains, 
the phenomenon of décrochement "firmly re-established the abstract monetary 
calculation that had been practised in ancient Babylon" (Ingham 2004, p. 110). This 
time, however, the reconstitution of the quintessential idea of money as 'abstract 
accounting for value' did not involve a mere repetition of things but set the ground 
for an actual evolution towards "the pure capitalist credit-money system" (Ingham 
2004, p. 78). As the story goes, during the Middle Ages new ways of thinking about 
money as a dematerialised, imaginary construction began to evolve in concomitance 
with the customary use of old 'money-stuffs', remnants of the previous monetary 
order. The de-linking of measure of value and means of payment made monetary 
relations extremely complex. The instruments of monetary governance thus started to 
change dramatically, opening up possibilities for experimenting new forms of credit 
arrangements and establishing altogether new 'things that answered to the 
description'. As a result, new credit-based means of payment began to circulate in 
private financial networks along with the traditional form of coinage (Ingham 2004, 
p. 113). In time, the regime of moneta immaginera led to the gradual development of 
                                                 
4  The notion of décrochement (de-linking or discontinuity) is borrowed from Bloch (1981). 
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modern monetary institutions, and in particular to the emergence of banks of deposits 
and public banks, the diffusion of the bill of exchange and, finally, the 
depersonalisation of debt relations and the emergence of the promissory note as a 
means of payment. Finally, in seventeenth-century England these institutional 
changes culminated in the emergence of a central bank, the institution of the public 
debt (national debt) and the hybridization of private bank credit and public sovereign 
currency: it was the birth of the modern capitalist credit-money, or else of money as 
an abstract claim (Ingham 2004, pp. 114-123).  
Unfortunately, this is not the place to properly engage with the content of 
Ingham's history of money. After all, if one excludes his stance on the development 
of capitalist credit-money in late seventeenth-century England (which has been 
criticised by recent scholarship5), Ingham does not really engage with any 
historically-specific context, but only provides a synthetic overview of alternative 
accounts of monetary history. I will thus concentrate my critique on a crucial 
methodological issue: Ingham's focus on state agency in the creation of money. 
Instead of grounding his historical analysis on actual processes of monetisation of 
debt relations, Ingham presents a highly schematic account of the development of 
money as the story of "successive, but overlapping, modes of monetary production"6 
(Ingham 2004, p. 78). Here money and the authority are thought to exist in a rather 
symbiotic relationship, as dissimilar though mutually beneficial institutions. More 
specifically, we find that the existence of money is logically justified by the existence 
of the authority, and vice versa, so that both appear as producing and reproducing 
themselves in symbiosis from principle to end, and without any reason for their 
organic development other than the reproduction of their logical conditions of 
existence. And so, in a circular argument, while money requires the state in order to 
exist and be accepted as such, at the same time the state requires money to establish 
                                                 
5 Ingham's account of the origins of capitalist credit-money has been criticised in particular by Kim 
(2011) and Knafo (2013). The first argues that, unlike what Ingham suggests, "the depersonalisation of 
bills of exchange was not a necessary condition for the origins of modern credit-money" (Kim 2011, 
p. 940). Instead, modern money was the product of a financial securitisation of debts that was first 
performed by goldsmith bankers, and which was connected to the historically-specific emergence in 
England of the legal institution of the trust. Similarly, Knafo sustains that "the state was not the 
decisive factor behind the broad circulation of banknotes" (Knafo 2013, p. 52) and emphasises by 
contrast the importance of goldsmith banking and, more generally, of financial agents, in the making 
of the English financial revolution. 
6  These modes of money production are essentially four: 1) money accounting according to a 
standard of value, without transferable tokens (earliest known case: Mesopotamia, third millennium 
BC); 2) precious metal coinage systems (Asia Minor, circa 700 BC to early twentieth century AD); 3) 
dual system of precious metal coinage and credit-money (fifteenth to early twenties century); 4) the 
pure capitalist credit-money system (mid-twentieth century onwards) (Ingham 2004, p. 78). 
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and exert its power. Among other things, this circular logic excludes the possibility 
for money to be disruptive of, rather than beneficial to, state power.  
Undoubtedly, Ingham emphasises the importance of the state in the construction 
of monetary relations also to invalidate the mainstream dogma of the market-driven 
origins of money. However, from a methodological point of view, his understanding 
of money 'as an institution' spectacularly mirrors the orthodox account. Indeed, 
whereas in the latter money is imagined to emerge from the market as a way to 
optimise the management of symmetrical relations grounded in barter-like exchange, 
in Ingham's discourse money is assumed to be established by the authority in order to 
promote the governance of asymmetrical relations grounded in debt. Either way, the 
rationale for the institution of money is not really situated within actual agent-agent 
relations (respectively exchange relations and debt relations), but unfolds from the 
undisputed agency of a single metaphysical entity (respectively the market and the 
state). This agency is strategically employed to logically justify, rather than explain, 
how historically money gets its value and, in Ingham's specific case, how debts are 
monetised. But what is more, it will be shown in the next section that, despite being 
qualified as an extra-economic factor, the authoritative agency that Ingham posits as 
a violent foundation for money’s value is in fact subtly permeated by a market logic.   
 
The riddle of the value of money 
The value of money, says Ingham, represents "the quintessential economic question" 
(Ingham 2004, p. 80), and yet "there is no consistent distinctively heterodox answer 
to the question of how money gets its value" (Ingham 2004, p. 56). The orthodox 
tradition, in its utilitarian spirit, has long eluded this question by positing a value-
price identity at the foundation of monetary theory, thus assuming in a tautological 
fashion that money is that peculiar use-value whose utility consists in its exchange-
value. Against this view, Ingham holds that the value of money cannot be derived 
from its exchange-value and therefore cannot be identified with its commodity price. 
Instead, in line with what has been argued previously, it corresponds to abstract 
purchasing power (Ingham 2004, p. 57), since the latter is what gives "substantive 
value" to money (see Ingham 2000, p. 29; 2004, p. 71). 
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Notably, Ingham's notion of substantive value is a legacy of Weber, and it is worth 
noting that in its original acceptation this notion explicitly referred to the market 
value of an asset serving as medium of exchange (Weber 1978, pp. 75-6)7. This for 
an obvious reason: as the power to purchase and exchange, the value of money 
cannot but be logically contingent upon the existence of a market economy. 
However, as Ingham rightly emphasises on more than one occasion, money's 
purchasing power is symptomatic of a market economy that does not conform to 
orthodox criteria, for here demand and supply are not bound to harmoniously meet 
after all to produce stable prices. On the contrary, purchasing power "at any point in 
time is the result of the economic 'battle of man with man' in which money is a 
weapon" (Weber, cited in Ingham 2004, p. 71), and namely "the enacted outcome of 
social and political conflicts between the main interests in the economy" (Ingham 
2004, p. 81) whereby debtors and creditors "struggle to monetise their positions of 
power by raising their price" (Ingham 2004, p. 81).  
In this situation of "real-world radical uncertainty" where no one wants to be a 
passive price-taker but on the contrary struggles to shape prices to her own 
advantage, economic and financial stability is never given but ought to be actively 
constructed. In this respect, the value of money lies precisely in its capacity to 
institute a form of "self-fulfilling long-term trust" among otherwise "potentially 
personally untrustworthy strangers" (Ingham 2004, p. 74). Thus, Ingham argues, 
money is able to do so because it is substantially a promise of payment, "and the 
production of promise involves trust" (Ingham 2004, p. 74). This is why, as a norm, 
"all money has a fiduciary character" (Ingham 2004, p. 85), including precious-metal 
money. Whence the following question arises: how is it possible that we get to 
experience and value something as a means of payment which is only a promise of 
payment?  
As I have already suggested in the previous section, Ingham solves this riddle (in 
fact, he avoids solving it) by postulating the ad hoc agency of the state as a violent 
foundation for money. Thus he argues that "[e]stablishing the promise requires 
                                                 
7 In particular, by bringing forth the notion of substantive value Weber (1978) aimed to criticise 
Knapp's idea that the validity of money could be entirely conferred by the authority of the state. On 
the contrary, according to Weber the type of validity bestowed by the state, which he termed formal, 
implied nothing as to the actual value of money. Indeed, for him the value of money was equivalent to 
"the rate at which it will be accepted in exchange for commodities" (Weber 1978, p. 178). 
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'authority' which ultimately rests on coercion" (Ingham 2004, p. 76). This coercive 
capacity is manifested primarily as the state's sovereign power to impose a debt on 
others by producing a "promise of last resort" (Ingham 2000, p. 29). The state 
promise is central to the construction of money's value because, besides giving 
credibility and political legitimacy to all other promises, it acts as a public tax upon 
the private economy (and thus upon the market). That is to say, in virtue of its fiscal 
prerogative not only is the state in the condition to establish within its sovereign 
domain the money of account and then proclaim the legal tender status of the means 
of payment and exchange but, more significantly, it can also determine the 
purchasing power of money "by influencing what must be done in an economy to 
earn the income to pay the tax" (Ingham 2004, p. 84).  
This introduces a fundamental contradiction in Ingham's discourse: by making the 
promise of last resort, the state functions as the par excellence market-maker in the 
economy and, in particular, as the market-maker for what 'by nature' (but in fact only 
'in theory') should not be a commodity: money. Such an understanding is a legacy of 
the neo-chartalist tradition (see Wray 1998; 2000; 2012; Tcherneva 2006). According 
to the latter the value of money is conferred by state acceptation of the money-
promise for tax settlement. This means that in theory "taxes drive money" (Wray 
1998; 2000) though, in practice, deficit spending does. Either way, the state is 
thought to govern the ebbs and flows of money, hence the social construction of its 
scarcity essential to the management of its purchasing power, respectively via 
taxation (which destroys money) and deficit spending (which creates it). 
Conformingly, both the institutional principle and end of money appear as 
converging in the fiscal agency of the state, the latter serving as the keeper of the 
original debt (rolled over and over again, ad infinitum, until the end of times) for 
which its subjects have fallen at the dawn of capitalism.  
Critically, despite moving from radically different ideas, the neo-chartalist 
approach nonetheless mirrors orthodox monetary economics for what concerns a 
crucial methodological issue: it analyses the state as if it were the biggest creditor 
(via taxation) and debtor (via deficit spending) in the economy - therefore "the single 
largest economic agency" (Ingham 2004, p. 84). Thus the state resembles at a macro 
level the utility-maximising agent of orthodox methodological individualism, 
bestowed with a unitary (though in this case collective) and partially autonomous 
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rationality8, and embedded in a world of market-driven social relations. The 
economic determinism of neo-chartalism clearly emerges from its logical thesis 
about the fiscal origins of money (see Wray 1998). The latter assumes the existence 
of a saturation point in the government's capacity to deficit spend (hence of a limit to 
its power to impose a tax) that is ultimately determined by market-driven 
considerations of supply and demand: "before that point [is] reached, the government 
would find queues of individuals showing up to offer goods and services to obtain 
dollars; beyond that point, the government would find no queue" (Wray 1998, p. 
158). As a result, according to the very logic of tax-driven money, the state is only 
formally free to "deficit spend" but in fact it ought to take into consideration the 
substantial constraint posed by the market9. Ineluctably, the moment the state starts 
'making the market', the market also starts 'making the state'.  
As a result, Ingham's argument that money is a promise underpinned by the state's 
taxing power and political legitimacy does not validate per se the idea that money's 
fiduciary value is "partly removed from the free market process" (Ingham 2004, p. 
179), provided that fiscal policy is also a means by which the state aims to 
commercialise its own promise of redemption according to a calculus of supply and 
demand. This, on the contrary, seems to unequivocally suggest that the state be itself 
subject to a regime of market imperatives. As Dodd has correctly pointed out in this 
respect,  
[i]n so far as it is conceivable that state acceptance is important for the identity of money 
only as a result of the size of the state as a transactor, [...] this might just as readily apply 
to a non-political institution such as a large firm. If the significance of the declaration by 
an institution that it will accept only a particular monetary form as payment is 
proportional to the scale of monetary obligations to that institution, this is an economic 
rather than political consideration. While it is true that the state's fiscal operations provide 
the reasons for its dominance within the payments network, this nevertheless means that 
the relationship between money and the state needs no longer be defined exclusively as a 
political or even legal question. The state's importance with regard to the identity of 
                                                 
8 As a matter of fact, the state acts autonomously and discretionary only when it comes to fiscal policy, 
but then it must "accommodate" the market when it comes to monetary policy (see Wray 1998; 2012; 
Tcherneva 2006). 
9 It is worth noting that, in criticising Knapp's state theory, Weber also pointed out that the formal 
power of the states to control monetary aggregates was grandly limited by the presence of substantial 
constraints posed by other interests. Among them, financial interests, "with particular reference to 
future foreign loans", were deemed to be "the decisive ones" (Weber 1978, pp. 178-9). 
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money would cease to be a question of trust or administrative competence and become 
instead an issue of economic obligation. (Dodd 1994, p. 29) 
Despite endorsing its main theses, Ingham is equally critical of the methodological 
nationalism of neo-chartalism10. For him neo-chartalists "have missed the 
significance of the political nature of both origins and functions of the linkage 
between state spending, taxes and bonds in the capitalist system" (Ingham 2004, p. 
143). In fact this linkage cannot be abstracted in the form of a mere accounting 
relationship between the money-supplying 'public sector' and the money-demanding 
'private sector', but ought to be analysed historically as a "complex triangular power 
struggle" (Ingham 2000, p. 33), namely as "a matter of an implicit settlement 
between the state, capitalist 'rentiers' and the tax-paying capitalist producers and 
workers" (Ingham 2004, p. 143). After all, money is not just some creature of the 
taxing authority, but is more specifically the product of a structure of social relations 
of credit-debt (Ingham 1996, p. 516). But there again, credit has been known to exist 
from immemorial time whereas money, as the uniform value of an impersonal 
promise of payment bearing abstract purchasing power, is from a historical point of 
view a pretty recent development. What is therefore the specificity of the structure of 
credit-debt relations out of which money is constituted? How are these debts 
involved in the construction of modern relationships of authority, sovereignty and 
autonomy?  
As I will show in the next section, Ingham misses the specificity of modern debt 
relations and the broader significance of money. Indeed, despite recognising the 
methodological limits of neo-chartalism, he ends up relying on the metaphysical 
agency of the 'monetary authorities' in order to justify the 'stable value' of modern 
money. This said, we can still infer from his account of the development and 
production of capitalist credit-money (Ingham 2004, pp. 107-151) a number of clues 
about what is truly specific about capitalist money and what makes it possible for a 
promise of payment to serve as a means of payment. Notably, these clues all point to 
a concept that is never explicitly referred to in Ingham's 'fundamentals for a theory of 
money': liquidity.  
                                                 
10 For other critical engagements with neo-chartalism see Mehrling 2000; Gnos and Rochon 2002; 
Rochon and Vernengo 2003; Lavoie 2013; Febrero 2009; Palley 2015a, 2015b; Frankel 1977; Graeber 
2011. 
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The subterranean theme of money as liquidity 
The most interesting aspect of Ingham's sociology remains its professed 
methodological relationalism, as exemplified by the following rule of thumb: 
"money has to be issued" and, more specifically, "money is always issued as a debt, 
or liability", hence it "cannot be created without the simultaneous creation of debt". 
Eventually, "[a]ll money is constituted by credit-debit relations", so that it is "the 
existence of a debt that gives the money value" (Ingham 2004, pp. 72-75, emphasis in 
the original).  
Notably, the debt out of which money is constituted enjoys a very peculiar trait: it 
is not just some contractual binding agreement by a specific debtor to pay a specific 
creditor, but it is a depersonalised debt: a liability that, regardless of the sorts of the 
original creditor-debtor counterparts, can be readily transferred and be broadly 
circulated as a 'net worth' (see also Heinsohn and Steiger 2000; 2006). Conformingly, 
Ingham explains that "capitalist credit-money", 'money as we know it' in Keynes' 
jargon (Keynes 1936), comes at the end of a long historical process of 
depersonalisation of debt relations (Ingham 2004, p. 119) whereby money was 
finally constituted as an "autonomous force of production" (Ingham 2000, p. 28). As 
a result, under capitalism even if all money is debt not all debt is money, because to 
properly serve as money debt must be "assignable - or transferable, or negotiable" 
(Ingham 2004, p. 72).  
Needless to say, this contradicts everything previously stated about money's extra-
economic foundations as well as the ontological primacy of the money of account. 
Indeed, on these new premises 'moneyness' depends entirely on the degree to which 
money is readily accepted by society (see also Bell 2001, p. 160): it is a euphemism 
to say that money is the most sought-after value in circulation or, to quote Simmel 
(1990, p. 124), that it is "inter-changeability personified". In short, money is 
liquidity11. This is fundamentally in line with the orthodox dogma, according to 
                                                 
11 Liquidity, as Nesvetailova (2010: 6) has pointed out, "is a very fluid, complex, multidimensional 
notion". However, for the sake of simplicity, it can be safely argued that liquidity denotes the 
institutionalisation of the possibility to readily negotiate and trade debts by means of debt. For this 
reason, liquidity ought not to be intended as an a-historical, universal attribute of money, but as a 
historically-specific phenomenon that is entangled from the start with the monetisation of debts and 
the rise of financial markets for debt securities. 
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which "'moneyness' is somewhat tautologically 'exchangeability' - that is, the most 
'liquid' commodity" (Ingham 2004, p. 6). Seemingly unaware of the enormous 
contradictions raised by his view of credit-money, Ingham maintains that the 
differentia specifica of capitalism "lies in the elastic creation of money by means of 
readily transferrable debt" (Ingham 2004, p. 108; p. 63).  
The capitalist monetary system's distinctiveness is that it contains a social mechanism by 
which privately contracted debtor-creditor relations [...] are routinely monetized. Private 
debt in its various forms (cheques, credit cards, promissory notes and so on) are [sic] 
converted into the most sought-after 'promise to pay' at the top of the hierarchy of 
promises. [...] This transformation of privately contracted debts into money is achieved 
by complex linkages between the banking and financial system and the state and, in turn, 
between the state and its own creditors (bond-owners) and debtors (taxpayers). These 
relations are mediated by a central bank when it accommodates the banking system's 
private promises to pay by accepting - that is, buying - them with sovereign money. 
(Ingham 2004, pp. 134-5) 
Suddenly, we come across the idea that rather than money being "peculiarly a 
creation of the state" (Keynes, cited in Ingham 2007, p. 269), "the state and the 
market share in the production of capitalist credit-money" (Ingham 2004, p. 144). As 
a matter of fact, the two are inherently entangled (via the central bank nexus) with a 
financial infrastructure of monetised debts, i.e. a 'hierarchy of promises' with varying 
degrees of liquidity, and built on a 'social mechanism' that essentially corresponds to 
debt discounting (though Ingham barely mentions the word 'discounting' throughout 
his work)12.  
This peculiar mode of monetary production can be roughly described as follows: 
in the effort to redeem themselves (in fact, to reproduce themselves by having access 
to credit and discharge their obligations), the least creditworthy agents in society 
(which include not only workers but also entrepreneurs) promise worth at a discount 
to the most creditworthy ones (bankers and financiers). The latter, in turn, get access 
at a better discount (thanks to the mediation of the central bank) to the general means 
                                                 
12 The concept of discounting has been recently revamped by Nitzan and Bichler (2000; 2009) to 
explain modern processes of capitalisation. However, it is worth mentioning that as early as the mid-
nineteenth century, Scottish political economist Henry Macleod placed the notion of debt discounting 
at the foundation of his Theory and Practice of Banking (1883). I genuinely recommend reading the 
work of this scholar, who was not only a forefather of contemporary credit theories of money but also a 
precursor of institutional and transactional economics.  
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of tax redemption (qua final settlements) - the "decisive money" of the system, using 
Knapp's words (Knapp 1924, p. 95). Notably, the means of tax redemption that is 
meant to fulfil the promise of payment is just another promise, though one 'high-
powered' by the most authoritative of all creditworthy agents: the state. The latter sits 
by definition on top of the hierarchy and is able to draw a check on itself at no 
discount because, tautologically, it "is viable and can effectively tax" (Ingham 2004, 
p. 141). The state promise of last resort "consequently [provides] the basis for the 
creation of money (supply) in the banking system" (Ingham 2004, p. 141).  
Altogether, the idea of a hierarchy of acceptability with sovereign high-powered 
money on top would seem to suggest that money is liquid because it is accepted by 
the state for tax redemption, in line with neo-chartalism. However, we learn from 
Ingham that this is not really the case. Indeed, the illusion of liquidation that the 
hierarchical articulation of promises ad infinitum puts in place is not imposed from 
above by the authority, but is "organized according to differential rates of interest" 
(see below) that are set from within debt relations (endogenously) via discounting, 
precisely as in a market for the commodity money. 
The various forms of private debt are thereby monetized - that is to say, exchanged for 
sovereign promises to pay that are fully transferable/acceptable anywhere within the 
sovereign space defined by the money of account. These arrangements organize debt into 
a hierarchy according to criteria of risk of default - that is to say, a stratification order of 
debt/credit topped by the most sought-after credit - usually, but not always, a sovereign 
state's promise to pay. This stratification ranking occurs at every level and is organized 
according to differential rates of interest. The rate at which the central bank lends to the 
banking system as a whole is the 'base' rate. The dependent rates offered by the banking 
and financial system are calculated in accordance with an assessment of credit risk and 
profitability. (Ingham 2004, p. 135, emphasis added) 
As a result of this bank-driven mechanism of debt discounting, even the least 
credible promise of payment can be potentially monetised and cashed (redeemed, 
liquidated) on the spot. This calls for a first consideration: from Ingham's own 
account of modern money we infer that it is not abstract accounting per se but 
concrete discounting what actually provides the generative calculation at the basis of 
the 'hybridization' of credit and currency (Ingham 2004, pp. 121-133) and, pace 
ontological nominalism, what best epitomises the technical principle of the 
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monetisation of debt relations. But this is not all. What's more interesting about 
discounting is that, when it is performed extensively and systematically, as in the 
capitalist regime, it ends up alimenting a self-generating, relatively autonomous 
process (Ingham 2004, p. 108; 2008, p. 71) based on "delaying payments and 
settlements and consistently making these deferrals overlap one another" (Bloch, as 
cited in Ingham 2004, p. 140). This is a monetisation of debt relations that instead of 
allowing for the final redemption of taxpayers is bound to give rise to "a regime that 
would collapse if everyone paid his debts" (Bloch, as cited in Ingham 2004, p. 108).  
As I have already suggested, the significance of money in such an infrastructure 
of liquid debt relations is precisely that it bears the potential not to pay, that is, to be 
withdrawn from exchange sensu strictu and be instead channelled into the 
speculative buying and selling of debts, to the point of putting overall exchanges to a 
stall, as in financial crises, and with the consequence of turning pro tem suspensions 
of debt settlements into a structural impossibility to pay the debt (see Hudson 2012). 
Crucially, this possibility to literally 'buy time' in financial matters, as engendered by 
debt discounting, and the resulting impossibility to liquidate the systemic debt 
overhang by the same means, calls for a second, important consideration: in order to 
procrastinate consistently the redeeming of time (the final rendering of accounts for 
debtors and creditors altogether), everyone must be able to engage in the systematic 
buying and selling of debts via discount markets (secondary markets for debts), 
because it is here that the time congealed in mutual rights (credits) and obligations 
(debts) is literally liquefied before maturity and made readily disposable for activities 
in primary markets in the form of purchasing power. 
Accordingly, the institution of money is intrinsically related with the market, yet 
not in the sense attributed to it by orthodoxy. Rather, it is integral to the historical 
development of an infrastructure of speculative markets for debts and debts alone, a 
pool of liquidity out of which a promise of payment ought to systematically emerge 
as the money bearing the largest number of investment opportunities in a given 
context. In that respect, it is worth noting that money does not merely function as a 
medium of exchange and a store of value, as the orthodox has it, but has been termed 
the "bearer of options" (Anderson 1917, pp. 425-6) precisely to specify its peculiarity 
as an "intergenerational store of value" that, unlike any other store of value (such as 
land, for instance), is in the condition to be interchanged at any point in time with 
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potentially any other value13, including other money, in virtue of its liquidity (see 
also Amato and Fantacci 2012). 
Put in this new light, the commodity trait of money appears undeniable. In line 
with the post-Keynesian tradition, money is the primary asset of the political 
economy, insofar as its most liquid financial object. And indeed Ingham is the first to 
admit that especially at the global level "the value of money is affected by its status 
as a commodity and, consequently, it can largely be explained in terms of supply and 
demand" (Ingham 2004, p. 83): eventually, "[o]nce constructed as an institutional 
fact, money is, of course, traded as a commodity" (Ingham 2004, p. 80)14. After all, 
as Schumpeter put it, "the money market", not the state, "is the 'headquarters' of 
capitalism" (Ingham 2004, p. 202). 
This brings us back to the notion of 'hierarchy of money'. As I have already 
suggested, the hierarchy does not define a structure of liabilities internal to the 
jurisdiction of the state, therefore subject to its fiscal power, as the idea of a reversed 
credit pyramid built on the basis of high-powered state money would suggest. 
Instead, it is a network of liquid debt relations cutting across sovereign domains, 
whereby access to money by all economic agents, comprising states, "is determined 
by an assessment of creditworthiness […] that includes a calculation of the degree of 
risk of default" (Ingham 2004, p. 137). The discounting of risk is therefore primarily 
a concern of creditors, and especially of state's creditors: 
[creditors] have to be satisfied, first, that state debt and the subsequent supply of money 
will not produce inflation and thereby erode the value of the fixed-interest investment in 
state bonds. Second, creditors have to be convinced that state revenue (taxation, customs 
duties, etc.) will be adequate for the service of interest payments. Consequently, 
governments attempt to establish their creditworthiness by conventions of 'sound finance' 
in order to secure the sale of their debt. (Ingham 2008, p. 77, emphasis added) 
                                                 
13 As Anderson (1917: 425, emphasis added) explains in this respect, "[t]his bearer of options function 
is often identified with the store of value function. The two are properly distinguished. [...] The 
important thing about the distinction is that for one purpose a high degree of saleability in the thing 
chosen is necessary, while in the other, such is not the case. The most common case of the 'bearer of 
options' function arises when men hold money, liquid securities of low yield and stable value, short 
loans, call loans, or bank-deposits, waiting for special opportunities in the market". 
14 Also, "[a]fter 'moneyness' has been established by the issuer's money of account and embodied in a 
particular form (metal, paper, electronic impulse, etc.), only then does it take on the status of a 
commodity that may be bought and sold, for example, in foreign exchange markets. In other words, 
once money has been produced, then economic analysis is applicable; but it is essential to understand 
that it cannot explain the existence of money" (Ingham 2004, p. 198, emphasis added).     
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Crucially, in order to secure the creditworthiness "that enables them to raise finance 
for spending by selling government bonds to the money market" (Ingham 2008, p. 
78), states do not need to actually honour their debts but, more specifically, they 
must show their willingness to pay them 'by conventions of sound finance', in spite of 
the fact that their sound financial practice might not be corresponded by any actual 
effectiveness in liquidating, or reducing, their debts.  
The whole point is indeed not to actually liquidate the debt, or to target inflation 
per se, but rather to "convince holders of [...] government debt that the value of their 
investment will not be eroded by inflation" (Ingham 2008, p. 78). In particular, "[i]t 
is the role of the central bank to establish credibility in an invariant monetary 
standard in relation to the creditworthiness of [state] fiscal policy and practice" 
(Ingham 2004, p. 145). The central bank, in other words, is primarily responsible for 
governing and stabilising the price at which money will be bought, so as to 
"influence estimations of its future value" (Ingham 2004, p. 83). Borrowing the 
expression from Mirowski (1991), Ingham calls this overall work of persuasion "the 
working fiction of an invariant monetary standard of abstract value" (Ingham 2004, 
p. 144).  
Significantly, this theatrical performance, or "impression management" (Ingham 
2004, pp. 144-50) is not set by the state as such, but is arranged by a broad and 
opaque ensemble of "monetary authorities", encompassing central banks in primis 
but also rating agencies and other non-state financial institutions (Ingham 2008, p. 
79). In the effort to ensure credibility in "stable money" (Ingham 2004, p. 145), and 
hence sustain the illusion of liquidability of debts, the monetary authorities are 
committed to establishing "a transparent procedural correctness that is assessed 
according to the agreed organizational arrangements and the current macro-economic 
thinking" (Ingham 2004, p. 148). Mainstream economic theory thus plays an 
essential performative role in framing and legitimising sound monetary policy 
(Ingham 2004, pp. 84, 198). In particular, Ingham continues, the monetary authorities 
"are engaged in the creation of an 'epistemic community' of understanding based on 
theoretical economic knowledge and routine practice" (Ingham 2004, p. 146). The 
basic aim of this community of technocratic knowledge is to depoliticize pro-rentier 
politics of "inflation targeting" in a way as to display them as a natural goal of an 
"independent" monetary policy (Ingham 2004, p. 146).  
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My critique is once again methodological: by framing in a final analysis the 
subterranean problem of liquidity as a question of socially-constructed credibility, 
Ingham makes the social struggle in which money is a weapon appear more and 
more incompatible with the Weberian (but also Marxian) battle of man with man. 
Indeed, the grounding argument that the value of money is ultimately a matter of 
socially constructed impersonal trust (in fact, a faith in redeemability) that owes its 
credibility to the persuasive performance of economic theory (as sponsored by the 
monetary authorities), altogether invite us to think of the value of money as the 
product of a battle of ideas. With this, to be sure, I do not intend to begin a critique of 
the performativity approach in social sciences. I will yet contend, in the wake of 
Konings (2010, p. 63), that arguments based on the performance metaphor tend to be 
overly-deterministic as "actors appear to be largely unreflective, primarily motivated 
by discursive structures or impulses and performing meanings in whose emergence 
they had little 'agency'".  
And indeed, despite all the constructivist fuss, the performance of the monetary 
authorities appears to be ultimately over-determined by a market rationality in an 
even more invasive and ultra-capillary fashion than it previously seemed to be. For 
unlike the state authority, the monetary authorities are no longer directly involved in 
the creation of money - i.e. they do not necessarily issue and/or accept the money - 
but are only concerned with its governance. Their job is to basically persuade the 
market to trust and accept state promises at a sound (appealing) price in order for the 
states to finance themselves and survive in a global economy whose needs and 
desires can largely be explained in terms of supply and demand. That is to say, 
monetary authorities do not even attempt to write and edit the dictionary in their own 
pecuniary terms but, more submissively, are involved in deploying its universal 
market terminology.  
 
Conclusions: the significance of money  
In this article I have engaged in a critical yet constructive manner with what I 
consider to be a very valuable and inspirational contribution in the field of monetary 
theory. My interest in the subject arose precisely through the eye-opening reading of 
Ingham's The nature of money. Now, by emphasising the methodological fallacies 
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and contradictions in his theory, I aim to instil a novel sense of what money is about. 
This new sense, or significance (I emphasise this word in opposition to the word 
'nature' adopted by Ingham), can be summarised as follows: while Ingham holds that 
"[m]oney cannot be said to exist without the simultaneous existence of a debt that it 
can discharge" (Ingham 2004, p. 12), I argue on the contrary that money cannot exist 
without the simultaneous existence of a debt that it will never discharge. In 
particular, I contend that Ingham has failed to grasp the specificity of modern money 
as the institution of a peculiar form of finance (not just of 'exchange') based on the 
production of liquidity and the systematic deferral of payments, thus leaving a 
number of interrelated questions unexplored. Among them, the most important 
revolve around: (a) the type of inter- and intra-class conflict that such a finance 
entails and, in turn, (b) the forms of wealth (re)distribution and speculation that are 
specific to the capitalist mode of monetary production. In the following conclusions I 
will therefore suggest some guidelines for future studies in money and finance.  
The first theme concerns monetary calculation. The idea that money is 
ontologically a metric and accounting technology has been gaining a transversal 
consent in social sciences. As it were, scholars seem to have learned to stop worrying 
about value and love the measure. Calculation, of course, remains a central topic of 
monetary theory (see for instance Amato, Fantacci, Doria 2010; Fourcade 2011; 
Christophers 2011). Yet, as I have argued, 'calculability in money terms' does not 
simply involve 'countability' sensu strictu, that is, a synchronic calculation based on 
the book-keeping of debts and the scaling of prices that are already given in relation 
to a money of account. Rather, it primarily involves discounting, a diachronic 
calculation of the present price of an asset in relation to its future value, as against a 
background of potential (market) opportunities.  
Focusing on discounting shifts the attention from those who allegedly 'count' to 
those who actually 'make' money. For discounting does not measure value properly 
speaking: instead, it brings it into being in the form of purchasing power. In 
particular, discounting generates money as liquidity by enabling "the expansion of 
both sides of the banking system's balance sheet" (Ingham 2004, p. 140). This 
'expansion' of banks' balance sheets does not merely involve a depersonalisation and 
transferability of debts, but is more specifically a process by which debts are 
commodified, capitalised and securitised (see Minsky 1986; Kim 2011; Amato and 
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Fantacci 2012; Allon 2015). Admittedly, the idea that banks, rather than states, create 
the great bulk of the money supply and enhance the liquidity of financial relations is 
not new: virtually all post-Keynesian scholars (including neo-chartalists) agree on 
this point. However, what is often disregarded, if not neglected, by the heterodox 
literature is that not only is the banking system’s production of liquidity connected to 
the emergence of speculative markets for debts, but it is also involved with the 
construction of a peculiar regime of finance where nobody is a genuine creditor 
because in principle every proprietor (and first and foremost the banker) is indebted 
to everybody else via a capillary infrastructure of liquidity.  
In particular, modern banking promotes a leveraging of real assets, that is, an 
overproduction of claims on titles of property (see Werner 2005; Schularick and 
Taylor 2012, Hudson 2012; Admati and Hellwig 2013). If carried out systematically 
(as it normally happens under capitalism) bank leverage inexorably leads to the 
consolidation of a structural positive debt-to-equity ratio in the overall system, that is, 
an accumulation of net worth in the form of liquid securities that literally flood the 
markets and further melt the solidity of contractual bonds, making altogether the 
system crisis-prone. Accordingly, in the capitalist regime the circulation of money 
must necessarily assume the contours of spirals of debt deferrals. By the latter I do 
not simply mean system-wide "boom and bust" credit cycles, but also and especially 
localised financial bubbles and processes of asset-price inflation. Like vortexes 
triggered by holes in a pool, these spirals are likely to cause the (more or less sudden) 
draining of liquidity, leaving the impression that in the same way as money would 
pop out of thin air it could readily return to it.  
This brings us to a second crucial topic: the question of modern money as 
liquidity, and how this relates to modern speculation. As liquidity, modern money 
involves a growth out of measure of debt instruments which enormously extends the 
margins of manoeuvre, and profit, for speculative activities in financial markets, one 
being certainly the making of financial bubbles. Notably, as Knafo (2009) has 
pointed out, a financial bubble is the consequence of a coordinated market-making 
activity. Thus it requires that speculators play with financial markets in a concerted 
fashion so as to ingenerate market confidence and sustain the illusion of liquidability 
of specifically inflated assets in what seems to be a virtuous circle "as everyone 
appears to win in the process, at least until the crisis hits" (Knafo 2009, p. 32).  
 27
Now, as Ingham and neo-chartalists maintain, the institution of money similarly 
involves a market-making activity, that is, an active promotion of the demand of 
money. After all, "everyone can create money: the problem is to get it accepted" 
(Minsky 1986, p. 255). The construction of liquidity, however, is not a concern of the 
state authority per se, but is connected to the promotion of secondary markets by 
financial agents and, in turn, to the emergence of new forms of financial speculation 
involving among other things a commercialisation of state sovereignty (see Palan 
1998; 2002). Accordingly, it could be rightly argued that, rather than simply entailing 
sovereignty (Ingham 2006, p. 261), money more specifically enables a negotiation of 
sovereignty by financial means, and by financial agents.  
In particular, as liquidity, money enables the power to readily negotiate a very 
special title of property: debts. The latter, as John Commons has rightly pointed out, 
are first and foremost rights to legal control, and "[l]egal control is future physical 
control" (Commons 1931, p. 657). Thus, as the power to gain future physical control 
over things and people, modern money encapsulates time at a very material (indeed 
historically-material) level of sociality where speculation is sovereign. Indeed, not 
only is speculation integral to the construction of modern forms of authority and 
sovereignty, but it is especially intrinsic to the very production of everything under 
capitalism (see Minsky 1986; Knafo 2009; 2012; Konings 2011b). As Macleod 
clearly saw ahead of the times, "speculation is the mother of production" (Macleod 
1883, p. 132).   
Conformingly, as "a social technology for connecting present and future" (Ingham 
2004, p. 72), money ought to be intended as the mother of speculation. Indeed, when 
proprietors perform their monetary transactions, they implicitly look towards the 
future (Commons 1924, p. 4) and delude themselves into believing that they can 
master 'uncertainty'. It goes without saying that what they see is never what is 
necessarily going to happen, but merely what they want to achieve. For some, 
especially for those who are committed to servicing their debt and producing 'by the 
sweat of their brow', the final goal is emancipation or, in exchange, the pro tem 
possibility not to pay whilst consuming (time). For others, especially for those who 
have time to invest in the game of finance, it is more of a mundane fantasy of 
perpetual money-making. Either way, what everybody fails to see, or perhaps choose 
to ignore, is the material cost that many must incur or anyway charge for 'living the 
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dream' of owning (in fact, owing) without necessarily having to pay for it: debt 
without end. 
Admittedly, by conceptualising money in these terms I am here calling for a 
tremendous re-consideration of what is today significant about it. For it is not true, as 
Ingham (2004, p. 12) asserts, that "something can only be issued as money if it is 
capable of cancelling any debt incurred by the issuer". Rather, something can only be 
issued as money if it is capable of buying time for both the issuer and the acceptor, by 
granting them the possibility to access historically-specific and contextually-
contingent markets for debts. As a result, money cannot exist without the 
simultaneous existence of a debt that it will never redeem because of an underlying 
conflict of interests among proprietors that nonetheless converge on the necessity to 
keep the overall spiral of debt relations ongoing.  
The theme of the financial conflict of interests calls for a third fundamental 
question: who or what are the authors/agents that are primarily involved in the 
historical making of money and how does this relate to the construction (qua 
commodification) of modern forms of sovereignty. As Ingham has already suggested 
at one point, "the rules [...] by which money is produced in the capitalist system 
depend, ultimately, on the willingness with which a state's debt will be accepted by 
an independent class of rentiers" (Ingham 2004, p. 144). In other words, the problem 
to get money accepted is not solved by resorting to the ad hoc violence of an 
undisputed taxing authority, but truly is a legitimate business, based on a negotiation 
of sovereignty. More specifically, it concerns an 'independent class of rentiers', 
namely transnational financiers that operate through states and markets. As a matter 
of fact, these actual agents do have a real interest (as calculated by means of 
discounting) in issuing money and then accepting it back, and the rationale for this 
interest can be found in just about everything interesting happening in between the 
opening and closing of accounts15.  
Once again, what happens in this in-between 'bubble in time' is not production per 
se, but finance and speculation. Indeed, inasmuch as production constitutes an 
                                                 
15 I am here paraphrasing Graeber (2011, p. 122). His original statement was: "[d]ebt is what happens 
in between: when the two parties cannot yet walk away from each other, because they are not yet 
equal. But it is carried out in the shadow of eventual equality. Because achieving that equality, 
however, destroys the very reason for having a relationship, just about everything interesting happens 
in between". 
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'imperative' for those (workers and entrepreneurs) who are compelled to service their 
ongoing debts, it is no more than a 'going concern'16 - indeed a pecuniary interest - 
for those (financiers and speculators) who are able to leverage their position and 
empower their agency while the accounts are kept open and inflated. Precisely these 
players who have a concrete interest in 'making money', in the double meaning of 
producing and accumulating money in and of itself (as value), are also those who 
more than everybody else are actively 'making history' to their own advantage, and in 
their own image. 
Accordingly, future studies in money and finance should refrain from reifying the 
pseudo-agency of the state and/or the market, because states and markets only 
provide an infrastructure for financial relations and as such carry no rationality in and 
of themselves17. Instead, more attention should be paid to the actual conflicts and 
negotiations occurring among proprietors - and especially among those who make 
money - and how these relations contribute to the shaping of modern forms of 
sovereignty and property18. In that respect, one should be very careful not to 
automatically subsume modern property relations under the rubric of creditor-debtor 
relations and, in turn, draw a logical identity between financiers and creditors. For in 
a system where a positive debt-to-equity ratio constitute the norm, so that debt in its 
various forms will represent "the most gigantic species of property" (Macleod 1883, 
p. 157), there can be no net creditor because as a matter of fact everyone is indebted 
as long as the 'illusion of liquidity' is kept in place. Hence, the real struggle is among 
debtors themselves, and especially among the most indebted of all debtors: first-
world bankers and financiers. As we have once again come to realise in recent years, 
the intra-class conflict among these too-big-to-pay agents is literally carried at the 
expense of the rest of the world of petty debtors and non-proprietors (people at the 
extreme margins of capitalism who are unable to access any credit whatsoever), and 
in plain disregard of the sorts of future generations - the true creditors of the current 
                                                 
16 A going concern is a business that functions without the threat of liquidation - in this case, without 
the threat of illiquidity - for the foreseeable future. On the significance of this concept in reference to 
modern finance and capitalism, see Commons 1924; Palan 2013. 
17 Ingham, by contrast, tends to reify the relationship between states and markets as one of opposing 
forces in a "balance of power" with each other, and it is not clear whether he considers the two as 
being held together in an abstract accounting relationship (as in one between public sector and private 
sector) or sees them as being governed by two distinct logics (one being political, the other being 
economic).  
18 See for instance Kim's work (2014) on the connection between finance, modern identity and the 
historical emergence of the legal trust as a form of double ownership. 
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order of things.   
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